

## Introduction to Phenomenological Research

Studies in Continental Thought

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Martin Heidegger

**Introduction to  
Phenomenological Research**

Translated by  
Daniel O. Dahlstrom

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## Translator's Foreword

Square brackets are used to indicate interpolations of original German words, of supplementary words or phrases, of alternative translations, and of an English translation of Greek and Latin texts not translated by Heidegger. Only those texts cited by Heidegger, for which he does not provide a translation or a sufficiently close paraphrase, are translated. Hence, if the text immediately following a Greek or Latin passage is not in square brackets, that text contains Heidegger's translation or paraphrase of the Greek or Latin passage. All other translations are my own. I have tried to follow the original German edition in italicizing some Latin words and not others. However, where the meaning of a Latin word or phrase is not clear from the text, a translation follows in square brackets. For example, in the following sentence from Part Two, Chapter Three, the Latin words *subjectum* and *apprehensum* are not italicized but only the latter term is translated and the translation placed in square brackets: "In affirming, willing, denying, rejecting, I have cogitationes but in the cogitationes there is something there, a subjectum that lies there from the outset as apprehensum [apprehended]."

For the most part I have tried to translate German words regularly with one English word or, if necessary, with one or more alternates. This policy applies in particular to the central term *Dasein* which is translated as "existence" or "existing" except in cases where Heidegger explicitly relates it to *Existenz* or calls attention to the *Da* in *Dasein*. In the latter, infrequent cases *Dasein* is translated "being-here" and *Existenz* is translated "existence." See, for example, the following text and translation (taken from Part Two, Chapter Five, § 34): "Es muß nun herausgestellt werden, was *Dasein selbst besagt*, was ein Grundcharakter des Daseins ist, der sich in dem *Da* ausdrückt": "It must now be established *what existence itself means*, what a basic character of existence or being-here is that expresses itself in the *here* [of being-here: *Dasein*]." This passage is instructive because in it Heidegger approaches his use of *Dasein* in *Sein und Zeit* where it applies to something equivalent (albeit not identical) to human existence. Just as frequently in the present lectures, however, he uses *Dasein* in the more generic and traditional sense that is not so restricted.

Like *Dasein*, *Angst* is used by Heidegger both in a way that prefigures the technical usage in *Sein und Zeit* and in a way that does not. Accordingly, *Angst vor Dasein* is translated "anxiety in the face of existence" in Part One, Chapter Two, § 14, but *Angst vor dem Scheiterhaufen* in Part Three, Chapter Two, § 46 is translated "fear of the stake." Among the other terms for which this latitude in using variants seemed appropriate, two others deserve mention. *Satz* is translated "sentence" when it clearly refers to a concrete linguistic entity as, for example, typically seems to be the case in the opening chapter's

interpretation of Aristotle. But it is translated "proposition," to correspond to the Latin *propositio* and to the Platonized sense of Descartes' *cogito sum* and search for principles which can be expressed in different sentences. *Grundsätzlich* is usually translated "principal" or "basic" and, only infrequently, "fundamental." Whenever *grundsätzlich* is translated "fundamental," it is placed in square brackets, following the translation. The German word *fundamental*—one of the most frequently used words in the text—is simply translated "fundamental."

The numbers in square brackets in the runningheads of the odd-numbered pages refer to the corresponding pages of the German original. In the footnotes, all numbers, unless otherwise indicated, stand for page numbers. For example, "op. cit., § 7, S. 10" stands for "op. cit., paragraph or section 7, page 10" whereas "op. cit., 15" stands for "op. cit., page 15." On those rare instances when I insert a footnote, it is placed in square brackets and indicated by the letters "D.D." following a dash. As an aid to the reader, the volume and page numbers of the standard twelve-volume edition of Descartes' works by Adam and Tannery (cited as *AT*) are given in square brackets following every footnote in the original German which includes a reference to a work of Descartes. This standard edition is *Oeuvres de Descartes*, edited by Ch. Adam and P. Tannery (revised edition, Paris: Vrin/C.N.R.S., 1964–76). It is cited in the margins of the English edition, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, volumes 1–3 (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Finally, I would like to thank John Sallis for proposing and encouraging the translation and Hermann Heidegger, Hartmut Tietjen, and Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann for the warm reception they gave me and their willing support of the project. For invaluable criticisms and suggestions, I would also like to express my deep gratitude to Klaus Brinkmann, Omar Bozeman, Eugenie Schleberger Dahlstrom, Bret J. Doyle, Aaron Garrett, Al Miller, Maria Miller, David Roochnik, Robert Scharff, Steven Scully, Claudius Strube, Ingvild Torsen, Nicolas de Warren, and Kevin White.

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## Introduction to Phenomenological Research



## Preliminary Remark

### The task of the lectures and the passion for questioning genuinely and rightly

The lectures have a twofold task: 1. Establishing and opening up the horizon within which specific *facts of the matter* are to be expected. Provisional orientation of the perspective, stripping away mistaken expectations. 2. Concretely working out the facts of the matter that have, step-by-step, been made more accessible; familiarity with the objects and with the way of dealing with them theoretically.

Before anything else, the following misguided expectations need to be stripped away: 1. No journalistic information about phenomenology, no divulging of some trick for perceiving essences. 2. More dangerous, because more entrenched: no foundation, no program or system, is given here; not even philosophy should be expected. It is my conviction that philosophy is at an end. We stand before completely new tasks that have nothing to do with traditional philosophy. This view is, however, only a clue. Only facts of the matter are of significance. Definition, classification, explication, and disputation are of secondary importance.

The task of the following considerations is threefold: 1. Elucidation of the *expression* "phenomenology"; 2. representation of the *breakthrough* of phenomenological research in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. 3. Representation of the *development* of phenomenology from this point on, to what extent it is maintained, to what extent it has taken a turn or in the end has been given up, as far as its decisive meaning is concerned.

History of the words:  $\phi\alpha\iota\acute{\nu}\omicron\mu\epsilon\upsilon\omicron\nu$  and  $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ —two original words of Greek philosophy; from the transformation of their meanings, it becomes possible to understand how the specific meaning of phenomenology arose. Insofar as these words enunciate "existence," we move, with their clarification, within the history of Western humanity's existence and the history of its self-interpretation. From Husserl's self-interpretation of "phenomenology" immediately after the *Logical Investigations*, it becomes understandable how he conceives and further shapes the task of phenomenological research. As a way of showing what we are up to, we will fix on existence as our main theme; that is to say, world, dealings in it, temporality, language, one's own interpretation of existence, possibilities of interpreting existence.

No acquaintance with philosophical notions is presupposed. To the contrary, [there are only] three presuppositions: a passion for *questioning* genuinely and rightly. The passion does not happen at will; it has its time and its tempo. A readiness must be there, the readiness that consists in: 1. concern for an in-

stinctively certain mastery in regard to prejudice; 2. care about the process of becoming at home in a specific science; 3. being prepared for the fact that, when it comes to questioning in order to know, life would sooner help in questioning everything else than be of any help in questioning the soul's own inertia, the so-called theoretical consideration.

Ad 1. Not absence of prejudice, which is a utopia. The idea of having no prejudice is itself the greatest prejudice. Mastery in the face of each possibility of something establishing itself as prejudice. Not free from prejudices but free for the possibility of giving up a prejudice at the decisive moment on the basis of a critical encounter with the subject matter. That is the form of existence of a scientific human.

Ad 2. Lethargy towards knowledge is the consequence of science conceived as a collection of material that has already been worked over. This lethargy is characteristic of today's educated consciousness. One has to see that precisely this aspect is fatal. One no longer understands what is actually going on. This cowardice when it comes to questioning often adorns itself as religiosity. Ultimate questioning, questioning that confronts itself, appears as temerity to this religiosity. One flees in the face of a fundamental possibility of existence, a possibility that seems today, alas, to have lost its way. The *sciences* are one possibility of existence and of existence's critical confrontation with itself. If each person, in his place opposite his science, experienced in specific questions that he critically confronts himself and his world here, then he has understood what science means.

Ad 3. The readiness for the questioning consists in a certain *maturity of existence*: it has not lapsed into surrogates; it is also not a matter of finishing as soon as possible, but instead of holding out for years in uncertainty, of maturing from that uncertainty for the critical confrontation with the matters under investigation, of being free to reject every hasty answer. For this it is necessary to free oneself from a tradition which in Greek philosophy was genuine: scientific behavior as theory. You need not think that you have to think what is thought here.

## PART ONE

### ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ and ΛΟΓΟΣ in Aristotle and Husserl's Self-Interpretation of Phenomenology

#### Chapter One

#### Elucidation of the expression "phenomenology" by going back to Aristotle

The expression "phenomenology" first appears in the eighteenth century in Christian Wolff's School, in Lambert's *Neues Organon*,<sup>1</sup> in connection with analogous developments popular at the time, like dianoiology and alethiology, and means a theory of illusion, a doctrine for avoiding illusion. A related concept is found in Kant. In a letter to Johann Heinrich Lambert, he writes: "It appears that a quite particular, although merely negative science (*phaenomenologia generalis*) must precede metaphysics, in which the validity and limits of the principia of sensibility are determined."<sup>2</sup> Later "Phenomenology" is the title for Hegel's major work.<sup>3</sup> In the Protestant theology of the nineteenth century, phenomenology of religions is conceived as a doctrine concerning the various manners of appearance of religions.<sup>4</sup> "Phenomenology" also appears in Franz Brentano's lectures on metaphysics (based upon oral communication from Husserl). Why did Husserl choose this expression? Why is the doctrine about the avoidance of illusion named "phenomenology" in the eight-

1. Johann Heinrich Lambert, *Neues Organon oder Gedanken über die Erforschung und Bezeichnung des Wahren und dessen Unterscheidung vom Irrthum und Schein*. 2 Bände (Leipzig 1764). *Erster Band*: Dianoiologie oder Lehre von den Gesetzen des Denkens; Alethiologie oder Lehre von der Wahrheit. *Zweiter Band*: Semiotik oder Lehre von der Bezeichnung der Gedanken und Dinge; Phänomenologie oder Lehre von dem Schein. [New Organon or Thoughts on the Investigation and Designation of the True and its Distinction from Error and Illusion, 2 volumes (Leipzig, 1764). First volume: Dianoiology or doctrine of the laws of thinking; alethiology or doctrine of truth. Second volume: Semiotics or doctrine of the designation of thoughts and things; Phenomenology or doctrine of illusion.]

2. *Briefe von und an Kant* [Letters from and to Kant]. Erster Teil: 1749–1789. In: *Immanuel Kants Werke*. Hrsg. v. E. Cassirer. Bd IX (Berlin 1918), S. 75. Kant mistakenly writes "*phaenomenologia*."

3. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* [Phenomenology of Spirit]. In: *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Werke*. Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten. Zweiter Band (Berlin 1832).

4. Pierre Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye, *Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte* [Textbook of the History of Religion]. Erster Band (Freiburg in Breisgau 1887). Vorwort, S. V; Phänomenologischer Theil, S. 48–170.

eenth century, and how does φαινόμενον [phenomenon] come to have the meaning of “illusion”? Is there, then, in the expression φαινόμενον some motivation for using it to designate illusion? The term “appearance” must be left out of play since, as a purported translation of the Greek words, it creates confusion. Even Περὶ ψυχῆς, “On the soul,” is misunderstood if one hangs on to the terms under discussion here. For Aristotle, perception, thinking, wanting are not experiences. Περὶ ψυχῆς is no psychology in the modern sense, but instead deals with the being of a human being (or of living beings in general) in the world.<sup>5</sup>

§ 1. Clarification of φαινόμενον on the basis of the Aristotelian analysis of perceiving the world by way of seeing

- a) Φαινόμενον as a distinctive manner of an entity’s presence:  
existence during the day

Phenomenology is put together from λόγος and φαινόμενον. Φαινόμενον means: something that shows itself. Φαίνομαι is the same as “to show itself,” φαίνω the same as “to bring something to the light of day.” The stem is φα; this is connected with φῶς which is the same as light, daylightness. In a concrete text of scientific investigations it is necessary to establish what facts of the matter are meant by the words. We shall consider the fact of the matter apart from the word and then, on the basis of the text, establish the sense in which that fact of the matter is meant by the word. For this purpose we choose Aristotle’s *De anima*, B (II), chapter 7 that deals with perceiving the world by way of seeing.<sup>6</sup> It is necessary to keep every bit of knowledge from physics, physiology at bay since they lack Aristotle’s focus. No explication with this sort of concreteness has ever been attempted again.

What is seeing, what is it that is perceived as such in seeing, how is what is accessible in seeing characterized with respect to its content and its perceptibility? Οὐ μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὄρατόν.<sup>7</sup> “What is perceivable in seeing is the visible”; something of this sort is characterized as color.<sup>8</sup> Color is what is spread over something visible in itself.<sup>9</sup> The respective coloring of an entity is perceived each time ἐν φωτί,<sup>10</sup> in light, more precisely, in daylight [im Hellen].

5. See the Appendix, Supplement 1 (p. 223).

6. Aristotelis de anima libri III. Recognovit G. Biehl. Editio altera curavit O. Apelt. In aedibus B. G. Teubneri (Lipsiae 1911). [*The three books of Aristotle’s “On the Soul,”* edited by G. Biehl, second edition by O. Apelt (Leipzig: Teubner, 1911).]

7. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418a26.

8. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418a27.

9. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418a29f.

10. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b3.

Thus, the first thing to be made out is what *daylight* is. Daylight is apparently something that lets something else be seen through it, διαφανές [transparent].<sup>11</sup> This daylight is not of itself visible, but only by means of a color, alien to it.<sup>12</sup> Daylight is what allows something to be seen, namely, the actual color (οἰκεῖον χρώμα<sup>13</sup>) of the things that I have in daylight.<sup>14</sup> Aristotle discovered that daylightness is not a body

(τί μὲν οὖν τὸ διαφανές καὶ τί τὸ φῶς, εἴρηται, ὅτι οὔτε πῦρ οὔθ' ὄλως σῶμα οὐδ' ἀπορροή σώματος οὐδενός . . . ἀλλὰ πυρός ἢ τοιοῦτου τινός παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ),<sup>15</sup>

[As for what the transparent [*Helle*] is and what light is, it has been explained that it is neither fire nor a body at all nor even the outflow of a body . . . but presence of fire or some such thing in the transparent,]

that it does not move,<sup>16</sup> but is instead the heaven's actual manner of existing,<sup>17</sup> allowing things to be seen, the day's being. Daylight is a *manner of presence* of [something] (παρουσία,<sup>18</sup> ἐντελέχεια<sup>19</sup>). Empedocles taught that light moves; καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς [but Empedocles was not right].<sup>20</sup> Trendelenburg saw in the Aristotelian doctrine a relapse; but this judgment shows that he did not understand Aristotle at all.<sup>21</sup>

Αἴσθησις [perception] is the manner of existing of something living in its world. The manners of perceiving things are characterized by Aristotle by means of the *sort of thing perceived*, what is accessible in the perceiving. There are *three sorts*<sup>22</sup> of αἴσθητά: 1. ἴδια, 2. κοινά, 3. συμβεβηκότα [things perceived: 1. special, 2. common, 3. incidentally at hand].

[1.] An ἴδιον<sup>23</sup> is something accessible through one specific manner of perceiving and *only through that manner of perceiving*. It has the character of being ἀεὶ ἀληθές [always true].<sup>24</sup> Seeing, insofar as it exists, always uncovers

11. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b4.

12. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b4ff.

13. Op. cit., Beta 7, 419a2.

14. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b2f.

15. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b13–17.

16. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b21f.

17. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b9.

18. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b16.

19. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b12, 418b30.

20. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b20f.

21. Aristotelis de anima libri tres. Ad interpretum Graecorum auctoritatem et codicum fidem recognovit commentariis illustravit F. A. Trendelenburg. Editio altera emendata et aucta. [*The three books of Aristotle's "On the soul,"* with F. A. Trendelenburg's inspection of the authority of the Greek interpreters and the faithfulness of the codices and his illustration with commentaries; second, improved and enlarged edition.] (Berlin 1877), 306: "Itaque Empedoclis sententia vero, quod recentior aetas invenit, propior, quam Aristoteles" [Thus, in truth, the opinion of Empedocles is more proper, as the age recently discovered, than that of Aristotle].

22. Aristotle, *De anima* (Biehl, Apelt), Beta 6, 418a8.

23. Op. cit., Beta 6, 418a11.

24. Op. cit., Gamma 3, 427b12.

only color, hearing always uncovers only sound. 2. κοινόν.<sup>25</sup> There are characteristic ways of being that are not fitted to one specific manner of perceiving, e.g., κίνησις [change]. 3. συμβεβηκός is what is regularly perceived (κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ λέγεται αἰσθητόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν εἶη Διάρου υἱός [something perceptible is said to be incidentally at hand, for instance, if the white thing were Diaeres' son]<sup>26</sup>). For, as a rule, I do not see color, I do not hear sounds, but instead the singer's song, something that is encountered along with the immediate perceiving [*das im nächsten Vernehmen Mitbegegnende*]. When it comes to the perceptibility of something κατὰ συμβεβηκός deception is possible and even the rule.

Aristotle determined color, among other things, to be an ἴδιον.<sup>27</sup> Daylight is the presence of fire.<sup>28</sup> Daylight does not move. Only the sun moves, the presence of which is the daylight. Whoever says that daylight moves is speaking παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα,<sup>29</sup> he is speaking past what shows itself. Φαινόμενον is what shows itself of itself to be of a certain sort and is immediately here as such. Speaking in a Kantian fashion, daylight is the condition of the possibility of the perceptibility of color. Precisely in this Kantian use of language, one can recognize the difference between what, in both cases, is understood by "condition." This is not to say, however, that Aristotle and Kant should be contrasted with one another as realists and idealists (there is no such contrast in Greek philosophy). What does "condition of the possibility of the perceptibility of color" mean, what does "being a condition" mean for Aristotle? Color is seen in daylight. The thing seen must be at daytime. Daylight is something that is part of the being of the world itself. Daylight is the sun's presence. The character of being for this manner of being-present is to let things be seen through it. Letting something be seen is the sun's manner of being. The perceptibility of things is subject to a condition, that of a specific manner of being of this world itself. "Being a condition" applies to a manner of being of the world itself. The sun's being on hand, precisely *what* we mean when we determine: *it is daytime*, is part of the existence in the world. By this means we speak of a fact of the matter that is part of the being of the world itself. The result of this is that φαινόμενον initially means nothing other than a *distinctive manner of an entity's presence*.

25. Op. cit., Beta 6, 418a17ff.

26. Op. cit., Beta 6, 418a20f.

27. On this matter, see the Appendix, Supplement 2 (p. 223).

28. Aristotle, *De anima*, B 7, 418b16.

29. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b24.

b) Φαινόμενον as anything that of itself shows itself in daylight or darkness

The concept φαινόμενον is not limited solely to the presence of things during the day. It is broader and designates anything showing itself of itself, whether it does so *in daylight* or *in darkness*.

What, now, is darkness? For someone arguing in an empty-headed way, it is obviously not difficult to determine what it is. Daylight is διαφανές,<sup>30</sup> something that lets things be seen, darkness is an ἀδιαφανές, something that does not. But darkness also lets something be seen. There are visible things that are visible *only in the dark*:

οὐ πάντα δὲ ὁρατὰ ἐν φωτὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκάστου τὸ οἰκεῖον χρῶμα. ἔνια γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ φωτὶ οὐχ ὁράται, ἐν δὲ τῷ σκότει ποιεῖ αἴσθησιν, οἷον τὰ πυρῶδη φαινόμενα.<sup>31</sup>

[Not everything is visible in light, but only the proper color of each thing. For some things are not seen in light but produce perception in the dark, such as things that appear fire-like.]

Darkness is something that, in a quite specific way, lets things be seen. In order to establish the dark's difference from daylight, we must draw on a completely fundamental distinction of Aristotelian philosophy: the difference between ἐντελεχείᾳ [actual being] and δυνάμει ὄν [potential being]. Darkness is a δυνάμει ὄν,<sup>32</sup> something utterly positive. Since, in our doctrine of categories, we have not developed such primordial categories, we are unable to comprehend this peculiar structure. Insofar as darkness is a manner of "being away," it must be designated as στέρησις,<sup>33</sup> as the absence of something that should actually be on hand. Darkness' being consists in being *potential* daylight. It would be talking past Aristotle, if one were to say: "Daylight is what lets things be seen; thus, darkness is what does not." The dark also lets things be seen.

The basic concepts of philosophy, such as they run their course in the historical development, are not some property or possession of philosophy that one can hold onto and that stands outside the development. They have become far more our own nemesis insofar as the consideration and interpretation of existing as a whole is pervaded by such concepts that amount to nothing more than a possession of words. They signify the great danger that one philosophizes today in words rather than about things.

Φαινόμενον and λόγος give expression to a fact of the matter. Later the

30. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b4.

31. Op. cit., Beta 7, 419a1ff.

32. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b10f.

33. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b19.

motives in existence itself, on the basis of which φαινόμενον is able to take on the meaning of “illusion,” will become intelligible—so, too, it will become understandable how a philosophy that has become superficial and coasts along in words grasps existing entities as an “appearance of something.” Aristotle did not have so naïve a metaphysics. And if one attempts today, with the word “appearance” in hand, to offer a critique of phenomenology, it is a groundless endeavor against which I can only protest (compare Rickert, *Logos*, 1923<sup>34</sup>).

Φαινόμενον is what shows itself of itself as existing; it is encountered by life insofar as life stands towards its world in such a way that it sees the world, perceives it at all in the αἴσθησις. Ἴδια αἰσθητὰ [special perceptibles] are what are perceived in the strict sense of the term. On the other hand, κατὰ συμβεβηκός is perceiving immediately in such a way that from the outset something is originally here along with it. Only in this way are we able to see houses, trees, human beings. If I want to return to the ἴδια, then it is necessary to assume an isolated, artificial attitude. The expression φαίνεσθαι already designates what has been perceived κατὰ συμβεβηκός. If the sun shows itself, then it is here a foot wide, it does not appear so.

Now, the primordial nature of seeing for Aristotle is evident from the fact that he does not allow himself to be misled by the lack of an all-encompassing name for the things that only the night lets us see (thus for fireflies, etc.): δρατὸν δ' ἐστὶ χρῶμα μὲν, καὶ ὁ λόγος μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν [The visible is color and what can be articulated in a statement, though it happens to be nameless].<sup>35</sup> What matters to him is merely the fact that these things are here, that they are seen and, on the basis of their factual content, lay claim to being taken as existing. The fact that there is no name for these things indicates, however, that our language (doctrine of categories) is a language of the day. This holds particularly for the Greek language and is connected in their case with the basic starting point of their thinking and their formation of concepts. One cannot remedy that by somehow constructing a doctrine of categories of the night. Instead we must go back to a point prior to this opposition in order to be able to understand why the day has this priority.

Thanks to the word-combination παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα [beyond the phenomena],<sup>36</sup> which recurs repeatedly in Aristotle, the particular character of the claim made by φαινόμενον and what is thereby seized upon emerges. If it is *explicitly* a matter of grasping existence, of retaining it, of securing what shows itself in itself, then we remain in the context of science. In this context the meaning of φαινόμενον comes to a head: what shows itself in itself, with

34. H. Rickert, “Die Methode der Philosophie und das Unmittelbare. Eine Problemstellung” [The method of philosophy and the immediate; a posing of the problem]. In: *Logos*. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur. XII (1923/24): 235–280.

35. Aristotle, *De anima*, Beta 7, 418a26ff.

36. Op. cit., Beta 7, 418b24.

the explicit claim of serving as the basis for all further questioning and explicating. What matters for science is σφζειν τὰ φαινόμενα [to save the phenomena]; what shows itself in itself is thereby pressed into a fundamental position.<sup>37</sup> Something of this sort is possible in science. Science has the tendency to grasp and demonstrate existing entities in a way that does not leave anything uncovered. To be a scientific person is to be positioned in a specific manner over against the world's being. There are two determinations of this ἔξις [attitude],<sup>38</sup> determinations that, in themselves, belong together: 1. familiarity with the things that are subject to the science, ἐπιστήμη τοῦ πράγματος [knowledge of the thing]<sup>39</sup>; 2. a certain παιδεία [education],<sup>40</sup> being educated in such a way that one knows how to conduct oneself in the field of scientific investigation. The individual who has the παιδεία can decide quite certainly whether someone who undertakes an investigation is prattling or whether what he is conveying emerges from the subject matter (καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν [(whether) he conveys (it) well]).<sup>41</sup> On the basis of such παιδεία one must decide what type of investigation is precisely suited to the object. With regard to the possibilities of the investigation, it has to be decided whether, like earlier thinkers, one should posit existing and the determinations of an object's being as secondary and speak primarily of the genesis or not.<sup>42</sup> The answer is easy: only after one has fashioned the basis for the investigation, can one set out to answer the question of the origin and the "why" of the origin.<sup>43</sup> The first thing that needs to be established in building a house is the εἶδος [form]<sup>44</sup> and only then the ὕλη [matter]. Εἶδος means to make an impression. This making an impression is the house's being in its surroundings as a house, its look, "face." The φαινόμενον is the entity itself.

## § 2. The Aristotelian determination of λόγος

- a) Talk (λόγος) as a voice that means something (φωνή σημαντική);  
ὄνομα and ῥήμα

In what connection does the concept of φαινόμενον stand to what Aristotle explicates as λόγος? Τὸ φαινόμενον is the being that, in any possible investigation, must be appropriated in such a way that it provides the basis for the

37. Aristotelis de partibus animalium libri quattuor. Ex recognitione B. Langkavel. Lipsiae in aedibus B. G. Teubneri 1868. [*The four books of Aristotle's "On the Parts of Animals,"* edited by B. Langkavel (Leipzig: Teubner, 1868).] Cf. Alpha 1, 639b8; 640a14.

38. Op. cit., Alpha 1, 639a2f.

39. Op. cit., Alpha 1, 639a3.

40. Op. cit., Alpha 1, 639a4.

41. Op. cit., Alpha 1, 639a4ff.

42. Op. cit., Alpha 1, 640a10ff.

43. Op. cit., Alpha 1, 640a14f.

44. Op. cit., Alpha 1, 640a17.